Advanced Features

Routinator offers several advanced features to let operators gain operational experience with some of the ongoing work in the Internet Engineering Task Force to improve and augment RPKI.

Note

To manage ASPA, BGPsec or other RPKI objects, you can run Delegated RPKI with Krill. A growing number of hosted RIR systems allow you to manage these objects as well. Check with your RIR to find out what is available.

ASPA

Autonomous System Provider Authorisation (ASPA), currently described in two Internet drafts in the IETF, applies the concepts of authenticated origins we know from ROAs to the propagation of routes. An ASPA is a digitally signed object through which the holder of an Autonomous System (AS) can authorise one or more other ASes as its upstream providers. When validated, an ASPA’s content can be used for detection and mitigation of route leaks.

You can let Routinator process ASPA objects and include them in the published dataset. ASPA information will be exposed via RTR, as well as in the json and jsonext output formats, e.g.:

{
    "metadata": {
        "generated": 1681829067,
        "generatedTime": "2023-04-18T14:44:27Z"
    },
    "roas": [{
        "asn": "AS196615",
        "prefix": "93.175.147.0/24",
        "maxLength": 24,
        "source": [{
            "type": "roa",
            "uri": "rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFAULT/73/fe2d72-c2dd-46c1-9429-e66369649411/1/49sMtcwyAuAW2lVDSQBGhOHd9og.roa",
            "validity": {
                "notBefore": "2023-01-01T08:44:47Z",
                "notAfter": "2024-07-01T00:00:00Z"
            },
            "chainValidity": {
                "notBefore": "2023-04-18T14:32:13Z",
                "notAfter": "2023-04-20T00:00:00Z"
            },
            "stale": "2023-04-20T00:00:00Z"
        }]
    }],
    "routerKeys": [],
    "aspas": [{
      "customer": "AS64496",
      "afi": "ipv6",
      "providers": ["AS64499", "AS64511", "AS65551"],
      "source": [{
          "type": "aspa",
          "uri": "rsync://acmecorp.example.net/0/AS64496.asa",
          "tal": "ripe",
          "validity": {
              "notBefore": "2023-04-13T07:21:24Z",
              "notAfter": "2024-04-11T07:26:24Z"
          },
          "chainValidity": {
              "notBefore": "2023-04-18T14:32:13Z",
              "notAfter": "2023-04-20T00:00:00Z"
          },
          "stale": "2023-04-20T00:00:00Z"
        }]
    }]
}

New in version 0.13.0.

BGPsec

The goal of BGPsec, as described in RFC 8209, is to provide full AS path validation. For this operators will need to publish BGPsec router keys in the RPKI. As there is currently very limited deployment, validating these objects with Routinator is not enabled by default.

You can let Routinator process router keys and include them in the published dataset. BGPsec information will be exposed via RTR, as well as in the SLURM, json and jsonext output formats, e.g.:

{
    "metadata": {
        "generated": 1626853335,
        "generatedTime": "2021-07-21T07:42:15Z"
    },
    "roas": [{
        "asn": "AS196615",
        "prefix": "93.175.147.0/24",
        "maxLength": 24,
        "source": [{
            "type": "roa",
            "uri": "rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFAULT/73/fe2d72-c2dd-46c1-9429-e66369649411/1/49sMtcwyAuAW2lVDSQBGhOHd9og.roa",
            "validity": {
                "notBefore": "2021-01-01T04:39:56Z",
                "notAfter": "2022-07-01T00:00:00Z"
            },
            "chainValidity": {
                "notBefore": "2021-05-06T12:51:30Z",
                "notAfter": "2021-05-08T00:00:00Z"
            },
            "stale": "2021-05-08T00:00:00Z"
        }]
    }],
    "routerKeys": [{
        "asn": "AS64496",
        "SKI": "E2F075EC50E9F2EFCED81D44491D25D42A298D89",
        "routerPublicKey": "kwEwYHKoZIzj0CAtig5-QfEKpTtFgiqfiAFQg--LAQerAH2Mpp-GucoDAGBbhIqMFQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEgFcjQ_D33wNPsXxnAGb-mtZ7XQrVO9DQ6UlASh",
        "source": [{
            "type": "roa",
            "uri": "rsync://acmecorp.example.net/rpki/RIPE-NLACMECORP/R0tgdREopjYdeyeI-wXUJQ4p786.cer",
            "validity": {
                "notBefore": "2021-11-09T17:04:40Z",
                "notAfter": "2022-11-09T17:04:39Z"
            },
            "chainValidity": {
                "notBefore": "2022-01-16T14:45:51Z",
                "notAfter": "2021-01-18T00:00:00Z"
            },
            "stale": "2021-01-18T00:00:00Z"
        }]
    }],
    "aspas": []
}

New in version 0.11.0.

Resource Signed Checklists

Resource Signed Checklists allow any arbitrary file to be signed ‘with resources’. The RSC object is a separate file that cryptographically connects the document hash(es) with a set of resources. The receiver of the object can use Routinator to show these resources, and verify that it was created by their rightful holder.

One practical example where RSC could be valuable is to authorise a Bring Your Own IP (BYOIP) process, where you bring part or all of your publicly routable IPv4 or IPv6 address range from your on-premises network to a cloud provider. The document authorising BYOIP could be signed using RSC.

RSC objects can be generated using e.g. the MyAPNIC hosted service. The objects can be validated using Routinator. If it is valid, Routinator will report the resources used to sign the object:

routinator rsc --document a.txt --document b.txt --signature my-rsc.sig

Validation of these documents succeeded:
* a.txt
* b.txt

It was verified with an RSC with these resources:
* AS65536-65551
* AS64496
* 192.0.2.0/24
* 2001:DB8::/32

If it is not valid, it will output that and exit with exit code 1:

routinator rsc --document test2.txt --signature my-sig.sig

Failed to match document to valid entry in the check list 'test2.txt'.

The documents listed on this RSC are:
f2ca1bb6c7e907d06dafe4687e579fce76b37e4e93b7605022da52e6ccc26fd2  test.txt

Please be aware that RSCs may be bound to a specific file name, and those file names are case sensitive.

New in version 0.16.0.